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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF "FINAL" ADMINISTRATIVE
DECISIONS IN PENNSYLVANIA
BY F. EUGENE READER*
INTRODUCTION

It is a well-recognized fact today that significant amounts of litigation
take place before administrative tribunals, both on national and state levels.
In a society becoming increasingly complex and sophisticated, this phenomenon is not only desirable, but perhaps inevitable. Yet it cannot be gainsaid
that these agencies, notwithstanding considerable expertise on the part of
their constituents, do occasionally make mistakes. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recently observed:
Regardless of the admirable purpose for which these agencies
are usually established, it is a matter of frequent complaint and
common knowledge that the agencies at times act arbitrarily, or
capriciously, and unintentionally ignore or violate rights which are
ordained or guaranteed by the Federal or State Constitution, or
established by law. For these reasons it is imperative that a checkrein be kept upon them.'
This Article will examine the extent to which the legislature may preclude
the courts from exercising such a checkrein in Pennsylvania.
The most important body of law bearing on the availability of judicial
review is the Administrative Agency Law of 1945,2 which provides that any
person aggrieved by an adjudication of an administrative tribunal shall have
the right to appeal to the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas. 3 This
provision would seem to foreclose the entire inquiry, were it not for another
* Professor of Law, Dickinson School of Law; A.B., 1928, College of Wooster;
LL.B., 1931, University of Pennsylvania. The author wishes to acknowledge and to
express his gratitude for the research assistance of the following students of the Dickinson School of Law: Gerald J. Batt, Marwin A. Batt, John W. Blasko, Addison M.
Bowman, III, Gerald S. Lesher, Alan S. Readinger, Donald L. Reihart, and Charles B.
Zwally.
1. Keystone Raceway Corp. v. State Harness Racing Comm'n, 405 Pa. 1, 5, 173 A.2d
97, 99 (1961).
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 1710.1-.51 (1962).
3.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1710.41 (1962), provides: "Within thirty days after

the service of an adjudication ... any person aggrieved thereby who has a direct interest
in such adjudication shall have the right to appeal therefrom. Such appeal shall be taken
to the court of common pleas of Dauphin County."
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provision4 limiting the applicability of the right to appeal to certain specified
tribunals, leaving notable exceptions such as the Banking Board, the Building and Loan Board, and the Board of Finance and Revenue. 5 Furthermore,
the Administrative Agency Law specifically exempts from its requirements
regarding judicial review all agencies not having statewide jurisdiction and
all agencies whose adjudications, under existing law, are final or appealable
to a court other than the Dauphin County court.6 The extent of possible
judicial review of the decisions of these tribunals to which the Administrative
Agency Law is inapplicable is governed mainly by the availability of the
common law writs,7 equitable remedies, and miscellaneous proceedings, several of which will be examined separately.
CERTIORARI

Historically, the common law writ of certiorari issued out of the Court:
of King's Bench to examine and to review the proceedings of all inferior
courts. The writ was also available to review the decisions of boards or commissions created by statute in order to keep them within their proper juris-.
diction.8 In Pennsylvania, the Act of 17229 conferred upon the supreme
4. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1710.51 (1962), limits the applicability of the Administrative Agency Law to 47 stated agencies "and to any other agency which has been
made subject to the provisions of this act by any other act of Assembly."
5. Although certain portions of the Administrative Agency Law are applicable
to the Banking Board and the Building and Loan Board, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71,
§ 1710.51(b) (1962), and although the filing requirements contained in section 21 of
the act are made applicable to all state agencies, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1710.51(c)
(1962), the provision for judicial review does not extend to the three agencies mentioned
in text, or to any others not listed in the act.
The decisions of the Banking Board and of the Building and Loan Board are
rendered "conclusive and not subject to any review" by PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 733-501
(1962), and certain adjudications of the Board of Finance and Revenue are declared
"final" by PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 503(e) (1949).
6. The Administrative Agency Law definition of "agency" includes only those
bodies having statewide jurisdiction. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1710.2(b) (1962).
Section 1710.46 of the act provides that the provisions regarding judicial review "shall
not apply to any adjudication which under existing law (1) is final, or (2) may be
appealed to a court other than the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County."

7. The Act of May 22, 1722, 3

STATUTES AT LARGE OF PA.

298, 303 (1896), vested

the Pennsylvania Supreme Court with "the jurisdiction and powers . . . concerning all
and singular the premises according to law, as fully and amply, to all intents and
purposes whatsoever, as the justices of the court of King's Bench, common pleas and
exchequer at Westminster, or any of them, may or can do." See Carpentertown Coal
& Coke Co. v. Laird, 360 Pa. 94, 61 A.2d 426 (1948). This grant of common law
jurisdiction has never been derogated, except to the extent that it may be limited by the
Pennsylvania Constitution. See text accompanying note 43 infra.
8. See Rex v. Inhabitants of Glamorganshire, 1 L.R. 580 (1700) ; Reader, Methods
of Judicial Review Where No Direct Appeals Are Provided, 40 PA. B.A.Q. 303, 317

(1939).
9. See note 7 supra. As pointed out by Mr. Chief Justice Jones in Bell Appeal,
396 Pa. 592, 599, 152 A.2d 731, 734-35 (1959), the type of certiorari with which this
Article is concerned should not be confused with the certiorari used by both the
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court the exclusive power to issue certiorari. The superior court, never
having been endowed with common law jurisdiction, is without power to
issue the writ.' Because the courts of common pleas are limited by the Constitution of 1874 to the issuance of certiorari only to "Justices of the Peace
and other inferior courts not of record," these courts are precluded from
issuing the writ to administrative tribunals."
The supreme court has consistently held that its certiorari jurisdiction
cannot be derogated by legislative enactment, even when a statute expressly
denies any appeal from an agency's adjudication. 12 The writ would therefore seem an ideal review device in all cases where appeal from an administrative adjudication is either not provided for or expressly disallowed by
statute; however, it will be seen that certiorari does not automatically issue,
and that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has imposed certain limitations on
its utilization.
Just as, historically, certiorari was available to review only the decisions
of judicial tribunals, so today the writ will lie only to an administrative agency
performing an adjudicative function.' 3 The distinction has been drawn
between those administrative acts judicial and those legislative in nature. In
Newport Township School Dist. v. State Tax Equalization Bd, 1 4 the supreme
court explained this distinction as follows:
[T]he writ lies only to inferior tribunals and officers exercising
judicial functions and the act to be reviewed must be judicial in its
nature, not ministerial or legislative. Though the tribunal need not
be technically judicial or constitute a court of justice in the ordinary
sense, if they are invested by the legislature with the power to decide
on property rights of others they are acting judicially in making
their decision whatever may be their public character.'3
supreme and superior courts for the limited purpose of obtaining the record in the

court below when an authorized appeal has been taken.
10. Bell Appeal, supra note 9. The supreme court has succinctly delimited the
appellate jurisdiction of the superior court as follows: "The Superior Court's appellate

jurisdiction rests exclusively in direct appeal to it when expressly authorized by statute."
Id. at 608, 152 A.2d at 739.
11. PA. CoNsT. art. 5, § 10 (Emphasis added.) ; see Nobles v. Piollet, 16 Pa. Super.
386 (1901).
12. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co. v. Myers, 388 Pa. 444, 130 A.2d 686 (1957). For a
good discussion of the historical development of the writ of certiorari in Pennsylvania,
see Rimer's Contested Election, 316 Pa. 342, 175 Atl. 544 (1934).
13. The proper classification of administrative functions as either legislative or

adjudicative has long plagued the courts. See 1

DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE

§ 5.01 (1958), wherein the author notes that, in many borderline cases involving mixed
functions, classification should be attempted only when some practical question (e.g.,
whether or not certiorari will lie) hinges on the label, and then the label should be
affixed with an eye toward producing a good result in the particular case.
14. 366 Pa. 603, 79 A.2d 641 (1951).
15. Id. at 611, 79 A.2d at 644.
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Although this is an accurate statement of the rule, the difficulty lies in its
application. It would seem that the question whether a tribunal is exercising
a judicial function does not lend itself to generalization and is best left to a
case-by-case analysis. 16
Assuming that a particular function of an administrative agency is judicial or quasi-judicial in nature, the most significant question will concern the
permissible scope of the court's power to review, and this question will de.pend upon whether broad or narrow certiorari will lie. In Twenty-First
Senatorial Dist. Nomination,'7 the supreme court stated:
Where, in a statutory proceeding, the legislature fails to provide
for an appeal, and because of that omission, the action of the tribunal
involved is, generally speaking, considered final . . . a certiorari
to inspect the record, in the broadest sense allowed by our cases,
may, nevertheless, issue; but where the legislature . . . particularly

states that no appeal shall be permitted, then review, beyond determining questions of jurisdiction, cannot be had . .

..

If the applicable statute is silent regarding appeal from an agency's determination, the supreme court will review the entire record on broad certiorari
to determine whether the findings were supported by competent evidence and
to correct mistakes of law and abuses of discretion.' 9 However, the legislature, although powerless to preclude the issuance of certiorari to an administrative tribunal, can, by expressly denying appeal from that agency's determinations, limit drastically the scope of review. Such limited review is
termed "narrow certiorari," and the following discussion in this section will
concern itself primarily with the adequacy and availability of this form of
judicial review.
It is well settled that the court will consider questions of jurisdiction
and regularity of proceedings on narrow certiorari ;20 however, the question
16. See note 13 supra. Compare Delaware County Nat'l Bank v. Campbell, 378 Pa.
311, 106 A.2d 416 (1954), with Swank v. Myers, 386 Pa. 331, 126 A.2d 267 (1956).
17. 281 Pa. 273, 126 AtI. 566 (1924).
18. Id. at 279, 126 Ati. at 568.
19. Keystone Raceway Corp. v. State Harness Racing Comm'n, supra note 1, at 6,
173 A.2d at 99 (dictum). Although on broad certiorari the court will examine
the testimony to see if the findings are supported by adequate evidence, it will not weigh
the evidence nor substitute its discretion for that of the tribunal below. Bell Appeal,
supra note 9, at 611, 152 A.2d at 740.
20. Twenty-First Senatorial Dist. Nomination, supra note 17. The only Pennsylvania decision expressly concerning regularity of proceedings was Foley Bros., Inc.
v. Commonwealth, 400 Pa. 584, 163 A.2d 80 (1960), which was before the court on
narrow certiorari from a decision of the Board of Arbitration in favor of the plaintiff,
Foley Bros. The Commonwealth questioned the lawfulness of the Board's decision,
which had been rendered without a trial de novo after the death of one of the arbitrators.
The court's review of this alleged defect was predicated on regularity of proceedings;
however, the Board's conclusion, that the death of a member did not vitiate the proceedings before it, was ultimately affirmed by the court.
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whether an agency is derogating its jurisdiction in a given case is by no means
clear. In Raby v. Board of Fin. & Revenue,21 the question was whether the
refusal of the board to grant a refund of tax levied under the Realty Transfer
Regulations 22 was reviewable. The plaintiff maintained that the levying of
the tax was in violation of the taxing act, and that therefore the refusal of
the board to permit the refund was an abuse of its jurisdiction. The court
pointed out, however, that this argument actually went to the merits of the
controversy, and concluded:
The appellants may not expand the borders of a narrow certiorari by calling something what it is not. They speak jurisdiction
but they argue merits. .

.

. They do not question that the Board

had the right to pass upon the demand. They only maintain that
the Board made a mistake in refusing the refund ....23
This was an application of the traditional concept of jurisdiction as limited
to the power of the tribunal to enter upon a particular inquiry, or the power
of a tribunal to hear a particular type of case. In another sense, however, it
may be suggested that, since administrative tribunals have no inherent jurisdiction beyond that conferred by their enabling acts, any misapplication of
law would present an abuse of jurisdiction. For instance, in Raby, had the
Board of Finance and Revenue misinterpreted The Realty Transfer Tax
Act, it might be said that the Board had exceeded its power in the proceedings
and therefore had abused its jurisdiction.
The proposition that action in excess of statutory power constitutes
abuse of jurisdiction finds support in the case of Dauphin Deposit Trust Co.
v. Myers,24 which involved a decision of the state Department of Banking
disapproving a proposed bank merger. Because the applicable statute 25
declared the Department's decisions not subject to review, the supreme court
was limited to the question of the jurisdiction of the Department in the proceedings. The court acknowledged its limited scope of review, citing TwentyFirst Senatorial Dist. Nomination,26 then conceded that "it is clear as crystal
that the Department of Banking has the jurisdiction and the power to consider
and determine controversies of the general class as well as the specific contro21. 405 Pa. 495, 176 A.2d 661 (1962).
22. The regulations in question were promulgated on September 3, 1957, pursuant
to The Realty Transfer Tax Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §§ 3283-92 (Supp. 1961).
23. Raby v. Board of Fin. & Revenue, supra note 21, at 498, 176 A.2d at 663.
24. Supra note 12.
25. The applicable portion of the Banking Code, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 819-1406c.
(1939), provides in part: "If the Department of Banking disapproves the articles of
merger or the articles of consolidation, it shall return them to the Department of State,
stating in detail its reasons for doing so .... The decision of the Department of Banking
shall be conclusive and not subject to review."
26. Supra note 17.
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versies and issues presented in this case."' 27 This determination would
seem to have concluded the inquiry, had the opinion not ended as follows:
However an important point has been overlooked. Neither the
decisions hereinabove cited nor the language of the opinions therein
precludes this Court from reversing an order of an administrative
agency or a judgment, order or decree of a lower Court where an
excess of powers, i.e., powers beyond those granted or possessed,
was exercised by such an agency or lower court. This is such a
we must reverse the
case and for the reasons hereinabove 2set
s forth
order of the Department of Banking.
This situation, however, may be distinguished from the Raby case, because
there the alleged misinterpretation of law did not concern the enabling act
of the agency involved; hence, the agency, whether correct or incorrect in
its application of law, was not exceeding its statutorily conferred power.
In addition to the ability to pass on questions of jurisdiction, excess of
power, and regularity of proceedings, the supreme court's scope of review
on narrow certiorari seems recently to have been expanded to include violations of the federal or state constitutions. The recent case of DeVito v. Civil
Service Comm'n29 involved an appeal by the City of Philadelphia from a
common pleas decision reversing an order of the Philadelphia Civil Service
Commission, which had affirmed the dismissal of two police officers for
failing to submit to polygraph tests. The scope of review of the court of
common pleas was limited by the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter to "jurisdictional or procedural grounds," and the supreme court treated the case as
one in which the lower court had been limited to review by narrow certiorari. The court stated two exceptions to this limited scope of review, the
first being where an agency exceeds "those powers possessed by it."3 For
this proposition the court relied on the above-quoted language from Dauphin
Deposit Trust Co. v. Myers. The second exception, noted the court, is the
situation where individual or property rights guaranteed by the federal or
state constitution have been violated by the agency. 8' It is not clear which of
these exceptions was relied on by the supreme court in its affirmance of the
lower court, but either would seem to support the court's action. It has been
said that, "where the statute provides no right of appeal to the courts from
the determination [sic] of administrative tribunals on constitutional grounds,
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Dauphin Deposit Trust Co. v. Myers, supra note 12, at 461, 130 A.2d at 694.
Id. at 462, 130 A.2d at 694-95.
404 Pa. 354, 172 A.2d 161 (1962).
Id. at 358, 172 A.2d at 163.
Id. at 359, 172 A.2d at 163-64.

19621

"FINAL" ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS

the right will be implied."5'' 2 It would thus seem that any constitutional
issue is properly raised on narrow certiorari.
In the recent case of Keystone Raceway Corp. v. State Harness Racing
CoMnm'n,8s the supreme court pointed out, by way of dictum, that "the law
is well settled" that on narrow certiorari the court will review (1) jurisdiction, (2) regularity of proceedings, (3) excess in exercise of powers, and
(4) constitutional questions.8 4 Although the evolution which has resulted in
these four areas of review on narrow certiorari certainly represents a broadening of the scope of the writ, it must be borne in mind that mistakes of law and
abuses of discretion are still excluded from consideration.
Subject to certain qualifications to be discussed in subsequent portions
of this article, 35 it may be concluded that the Pennsylvania Legislature cannot be precluded from reposing nearly unlimited discretion 6 in an administrative tribunal. Although this conclusion finds no direct support in the
Pennsylvania cases, it is certainly implicit in many of the decisions concerning
narrow certiorari. Should the legislature be permitted so to deny review
of a clearly adjudicatory function exercised by its own creature? The supreme court has stated: "Where property rights, so secured, are unlawfully
invaded by the legislature, directly or by one of its agents, the aggrieved
person may appeal to the courts for redress. This right had its inception in
the Magna Charta." 7 Although in context this principle was employed to
infer a right of appeal where the applicable statute was silent in this regard,
it would seem to support a right to judicial review which the legislature
cannot deny. It cannot be gainsaid that the determination of questions of
law is the very essence of the judicial power and, accordingly, it would seem
that the constitutional provision 8 vesting judicial power in the courts precludes
vesting such power with finality in administrative tribunals.
32. Harris v. State Bd. of Optometrical Examiners, 287 Pa. 531, 534, 135 Atl.
237, 238 (1926).
33. Supra note 1.
34. Id. at 5-6, 173 A.2d at 99. The court cited the DeVito (supra note 29)

and Dauphin Deposit (supra note 12) cases in support of this proposition.
35. See pp. 14, 22, 26, 28 infra.

36. Although the legislature often prescribes statutory guidelines or standards
pursuant to which the discretion of a given body should be exercised (e.g., PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 72, §§ 503(a)-(c) (Supp. 1961), sets forth in detail the powers and duties
of the Board of Finance and Revenue with respect to granting and withholding of

refunds of state taxes and license fees), it seems doubtful whether such "instructions"
could ever be as effective as a simple provision for appeal to a court. One authority has
suggested: "The protection of advance -legislative guidance is of little or no consequence
as compared with the protection that can and should be provided through adequate

procedural safeguards, appropriate legislative supervision or re-examination, and the
accustomed scope of judicial review." 1 DAvis, op. cit. supra note 13, § 2.05, at 99.
37. Harris v. State Bd. of Optometrical Examiners, supra note 32, at 534, 135 Atl.
at 238.
38. PA. CONST. art. 5, § 1, provides: "The judicial power of this Commonwealth
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Should not a litigant be afforded one adjudication of his rights in a
court of law? The original function of narrow certiorari was to permit a
limited review from the action of a lower court which had been accorded
finality by the legislature.3 9 Although it is concededly too late to suggest
that the writ should never have been invoked to limit review of administrative adjudications, it may be noted that the tendency of the courts to broaden
the scope of narrow certiorari seems an attempt to ease the bindings of this
self-imposed straitjacket. 40 Perhaps the end result of this broadening will be
the eventual abolition of the distinction between broad and narrow certiorari,
at least insofar as administrative agencies are concerned.
MANDAMUS

At common law mandamus Was a high prerogative writ which could
be issued only out of the Court of King's Bench. Although issued from a
court of law, the writ has historically been imbued with equitable character-.
istics, in that it affords relief only when an aggrieved person has no other
41
adequate legal remedy.
Although the Act of May 22, 1722,42 would permit the supreme court
to issue mandamus generally, the Constitution of 1874 empowered the su-.
preme court to issue mandamus only to inferior courts, 4 thereby precluding
its issuance to administrative tribunals. The superior court has no man44
damus jurisdiction.
shall be vested in a Supreme Court, in courts of common pleas, courts of oyer and
terminer and general jail delivery, courts of quarter sessions of the peace, orphans'
courts, magistrates' courts, and in such other courts as the General Assembly may from
time to time establish." To the extent that the adjudication of questions of law (as distinguished from fact finding) is performed exclusively by an administrative tribunal,
it may be suggested that a conflict with article 5 exists.
39. See Rimer's Contested Election, supra note 12. Here the party aggrieved by
an administrative adjudication had full judicial review in a court and the only question
was whether the legislature could limit the scope of a second judicial review in an
appellate court. Yet the rule permitting the latter was carried over to the situation where
the party was seeking his first and only judicial review of an administrative adjudication. Compare authorities cited and text accompanying notes 98, 99, and 123 supra.
40. See, e.g., DeVito v. Civil Service Comm'n, supra note 29; Dauphin Deposit
Trust Co. v. Myers, supra note 12; see generally, 3 DAVIs, op. cit. supra note 13,
§ 24.02.
41. Holdsworth states: "When there is no specific remedy the court will grant a
mandamus that justice may be done. . . . But if there is a more convenient remedy it
will not be granted." 1 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 229 (1931).
"Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and the writ will issue only where there
is a clear legal right in the plaintiff, a corresponding duty on the part of the defendant,
and a want of any other adequate, appropriate, and specific remedy." Mellinger v. Kuhn,
388 Pa. 83, 85, 130 A.2d 154, 155 (1957).
42. See note 7 supra.
43. PA. CoNsT. art. 5, § 3.
44. See note 10 supra.
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In 1836 the legislature granted power to the courts of common pleas to
issue mandamus "to all officers and magistrates elected or appointed ...
for the respective county in or for any township, district or place within such
county and to all corporations having their chief place of business within
such county." 45 This act limited the issuance of mandamus to local officials,
and until 1893 the common pleas courts had no jurisdiction over state
officers. 46

The Act of 1893, 4 T as amended, now permits the common pleas

courts to issue mandamus to all officers, magistrates and corporations within
their respective counties, and further provides that "the court of common
pleas of the county in which the seat of government is or may be located
shall have the power, and it shall be required, to issue the writ of mandamus
to all officers of the executive department of the Commonwealth . . . except

the Governor; all other heads of administrative departments of the State
government, except the Secretary of Banking; [and] all . . . administrative

'48
boards or commissions of the State government.
The procedural aspect of mandamus actions is now controlled by the
Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. 49 Rule 1091 provides that procedure
in the action of mandamus shall be in accordance with the rules relating to
the action of assumpsit. This rule would seem to provide that the action be
one of right, thus changing the prerogative nature of the writ. It appears,
however, that after the court has heard the merits, its issuance is nonetheless within the sound discretion of the court and is not a matter of absolute
right. 50
Because of the equitable nature of mandamus, its issuance is generally
foreclosed except to a tribunal whose decision is deemed conclusive and not
subject to review. 51 Certainly the statutory appeal provided by the Administrative Agency Law 52 can be considered an adequate legal remedy; furthermore, it would seem that the availability of broad certiorari would be a bar
to mandamus for the same reason. In no instance, however, should man-

45. Act of June 14, 1836, P.L. 622.
46. For a case denying the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County the right
to issue mandamus to the state superintendent of public instruction, see Commonwealth v.
Wickersham, 90 Pa. 311 (1879) ; see Reader, supra note 8, at 304.
47. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 1911-2002 (1951).
48. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1911 (1951).
49. PA STAT. ANN. tit. 12, app. (1951), as amended (Supp. 1961). Rules 1091
through 1098 govern the action of mandamus, and Rule 1457 suspends all other acts
dealing with mandamus insofar as they apply to practice and procedure.
50. Travis v. Teter, 370 Pa. 326, 87 A.2d 177 (1952) ; Waters v. Samuel, 367 Pa.

618, 80 A.2d 848 (1951).
51. See note 41 supra.
52. See notes 3 and 4 supra. But see M. P. Acee Co. v. Allegheny County, 18 Pa.
D. & C.2d 449 (C.P. 1958), holding that mandamus is not barred when the statutory
appeal procedure would work irreparable harm, or where the board designated to hear
the appeal has no power to afford the desired relief.
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damus be precluded when used to compel an agency to act when it refuses to
perform its function at all.5 3 An appeal provision is hardly adequate when
there is nothing to appeal.
For mandamus to issue, a petitioner must show a clear legal right to the
performance he is seeking and a corresponding duty in the defendant, in
addition to inadequacy of other legal remedies. 54 Generally, the petitioner
also must show that a demand and refusal was made for the requested performance, but as early as 1859 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided that
if the fulfilment of these requirements would be a vain act, it might be dispensed with. 55 Because of its equitable nature and unique historical development, mandamus is also subject to a great number of other substantive and
procedural limitations. A few of these will be mentioned to lend perspective
to the discussion which follows. For example, mandamus will not be available where the object sought is illegal 6 or when the plaintiff has unclean
hands. 57 When the object sought by the writ is oppressive the courts may
refuse its issuance, or if the circumstances of its use present great hardships
or unnecessary inconvenience the court may withhold its strict enforcement
or permit the performance to be carried out over a period of time.55 Mandamus cannot be used where it would be futile or useless to grant the writ. 9
It is strictly a remedy for a present injury and does not lie for threatened
harm. 60 Its proper function is to compel the doing of a specific thing and
not to enforce a general course of conduct or series of acts. 61 Finally, it has
been held that "mandamus will be granted when that has not been done which
'6' 2
should be done but not for the purpose of undoing what has been done.
With the above qualifications in mind, the next subject of inquiry
focuses attention on the answer to the following question: what is the proper
use of mandamus? Mandamus may properly be used for two purposes. The
53. "If [the Commissioners] . . .refuse to act at allthey may be mandamused to
perform their duty . . . ." Commonwealth ex rel. Bauer v. Cochran, 355 Pa. 318, 323,
49 A.2d 697, 699 (1946) ; see also note 63 infra.
54. See note 41 supra.
55. Commonwealth ex rel. Hamilton v. The Select and Common Councils of the
City of Pittsburgh, 34 Pa. 496, 512 (1859) : "The law never requires a vain thing....
[A]nd in regard to a refusal, anything which shows that the defendant does not intend
to perform the duty, is sufficient to warrant the issue of a mandamus."

56.
57.
58.
59.

See Reader, supra note 8, at 305-06.
Id. at 306.
Ibid.
Ibid.

60. Id. at 307. It has therefore been held that an injunction, rather than a mandamus,
should be sought to attack the constitutionality of a statute. Harris v. State Bd. of Optometrical Examiners, supra note 32; Soble v. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 40 Pa. D. & C.

215 (C.P. 1940).
61. Reader, Methods of Judicial Review Where No Direct Appeals Are Provided,
40 PA. B.A.Q. 303, 307 (1939).
62. Baldwin v. Colegrove, 45 Dauphin 430, 437 (Pa. C.P. 1938).
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first is to compel an individual or agency to perform an act which should be
done.6 3 This is the usual employment of the writ. The second purpose, with
which the following discussion is primarily concerned, is as a 'means of
4
This
obtaining judicial review of an administrative tribunal's decision.6
use, in light of the cases which have passed on its propriety, is veiled in
confusion.
The ambiguity and confusion surrounding the use of mandamus as a
means of judicial review is typified by the case of Tannenbaum v.
D'Ascenzo,65 concerning a licensed osteopathic physician who had been
denied the position of school medical inspector of the Philadelphia School
District, after having passed a city civil service examination for the post.
The defendant Director of Public Health had selected a medical doctor who
had scored lower on the examination, and plaintiff alleged that the director
had misinterpreted a statute and that mandamus should issue to compel the
defendant to act according to law by appointing plaintiff to the position. The
court denied the writ, holding that the director was not bound to follow the
results of the civil service examination because he was vested with a discretionary function which had been properly exercised.
The case is of special importance to this discussion because of the
manner in which the court approached its solution. The puzzling concepts
which presumably govern the "proper" use of mandamus, and which were
considered by the court, are as follows:
[1] Mandamus is a remedy of great antiquity. It is extraordinary
in character and is a high prerogative writ66 used rather as a
last resort than a common mode of redress.
writ by which a ministerial act
[2] Mandamus is an appropriate
67
or duty will be enforced.
[3] [I]t is only where the duty is ministerial and does not involve
the exercise of discretion or judgment that mandamus lies.68
63. Clark v. Meehan, 367 Pa. 166, 80 A.2d 64 (1951); Commonwealth v.
McLaughlin, 120 Pa. 518, 14 Atl. 377 (1888). The writ has been successfully employed
against an auditor general who refused to comply with a statute because he thought it
was unconstitutional. Commonwealth ex rel. Bell v. Powell, 249 Pa. 144, 94 Atl. 746
(1915). It also has been employed to compel the Board of Finance and Revenue to pass
upon a petition for refund, which petition had been pending for over three years.
Chapman-Burrous, Inc. v. Board of Fin. & Revenue, 61 Dauphin 150 (Pa. C.P. 1950).
64. Garratt v. City of Philadelphia, 387 Pa. 442, 127 A.2d 738 (1957); Hotel
Casey Co. v. Ross, 343 Pa. 573, 23 A.2d 737 (1942).
65. 356 Pa. 260, 51 A.2d 757 (1947).
66. Id. at 262-63, 51 A.2d at 758, citing 11 STANDARD PA. PRACTICE 145 et seq.
(1938).
67. Tannenbaum v. D'Ascenzo, supra note 65, at 263, 51 A.2d at 758, citing Re
Porter Township Rd., 1 Walk. 10 (Pa. 1878), and Citizens' Nat'l Bank v. Irwin Bldg. &
Loan Ass'n, 316 Pa. 536, 175 Atl. 399 (1934).
68. Tannenbaum v. D'Ascenzo, supra note 65, at 263, 51 A.2d at 758, citing Homan
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[4] In matters involving official discretion mandamus may be resorted to for the purpose of compelling the exercise thereof,
but not to interfere
with the manner in which the discretion
69
shall be exercised.
[5] But where by a mistaken view of the law or by an arbitrary
exercise of authority there has70 been in fact no actual exercise
of discretion, the writ will lie.

One more principle, enunciated in the case of Garratt v. City of Philadelphia,71 must be included to complete the list:
[6] [M]andamus will not lie to control an official's discretion
where that official is vested with a discretionary power. However, the discretion is reviewable and reversible where it is
arbitrarily or fraudulently exercised or where . . . it is based

upon a mistaken view of the law.
The Tannenbaum case recognizes the coercive use of mandamus, as is
clearly shown in the fourth rule listed above. 72 The fifth and sixth rules
would seem to sanction the use of mandamus as a method of obtaining judicial review. However, this proposition must be reconciled with another
widely cited principle which has been expressed, in the case of Martz v.
Dietrick,73 as follows:
Where a person or body is clothed with judicial, deliberative or
discretionary powers, and he or it has exercised such powers according to his or its discretion, mandamus will not lie to compel a
revision or modification of the decision resulting from the exercise
of such discretion, though, in fact, the decision may have been
74

wrong.

Thus, the use of mandamus as a review device seems to depend on three
somewhat inconsistent concepts: (1) the writ may be used to compel but
not to control the exercise of discretion; (2) if such discretion is abused or
there is a mistaken view of the law as applied to the facts of the case, the
writ will issue to compel action according to law; and (3) when discretionary
powers have been exercised mandamus will not lie to compel a revision of
the decision though in fact the decision may have been wrong.
v. Mackey, 295 Pa. 82, 144 Atd. 897 (1928), and Findley v. City of Pittsburgh, 82 Pa.
251 (1876).
69. Tannenbaum v. D'Ascenzo, supra note 65, at 263, 51 A.2d at 758, citing Souder
v. Philadelphia, 305 Pa. 1, 156 AtI. 245 (1931), and Duffield v. Williamsport School
Dist., 162 Pa. 476, 29 Atl. 742 (1894).
70. Tannenbaum v. D'Ascenzo, supra note 65, at 263, 51 A.2d at 758, citing
Morland v. Hoffman, 184 Okla. 591, 89 P.2d 287 (1939).
71. Supra note 64, at 448, 127 A.2d at 741.
72. Other cases recognizing this use of the' writ are collected in note 63 supra.
73. 372 Pa. 102, 92 A.2d 681 (1952).
74. Id. at 109, 92 A.2d at 685. (Emphasis added.)
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The first rule seems. to be qualified by the second but the third rule
seems to conflict directly with this qualification. Can the conflict be resolved?
Close scrutiny of the cases involving the "even if wrong" rule of Martz v.
Dietrick may provide the answer to this question. The first case to develop
75
the "even if wrong" rule was Commonwealth ex rel. Griffith v. Cochran,
in which case the plaintiff sought to force the Secretary of the Land Office
to prepare and to deliver the usual calculations preparatory to the patenting
of certain lands. The Secretary had completed the calculations but the plaintiff
challenged his method. The court held that mandamus would not lie because
the calculations were much more than a "ministerial duty," and because the
plaintiff was seeking to compel an exercise of the Secretary's discretion.
Therefore it felt that even though it might have decided otherwise, the
Secretary's calculations were reasonably completed and the court's judgment
should not be substituted for that of the Secretary. The court also noted the
possible availability of an action of ejectment at law.
Close observation reveals that the language of the case went considerably
beyond the holding. The court stated that mandamus would not lie "even if
there was a total defect of justice,"7 6 yet the opinion held only that the court
would not substitute its judgment for that of the Secretary, who had reasonably exercised his discretion. So from the very outset the "even if wrong"
rule meant only that if an administrative officer had exercised his discretion
reasonably then mandamus would not lie, even if the court, in passing on
the issue, might have reached a different conclusion.
Baldwin v. Colegrove77 is another case in which the "even if wrong"
rule is quoted but the denial of mandamus may be explained on another
ground, i.e., an inherent limitation on the issuance of the writ. In that case
the petitioner was the receiver of a company the principal activity of which was
the manufacturing and processing of gravel and sand for use in construction.
Pursuant to his duties of receivership, he submitted a bid to the Secretary
of the Department of Property and Supplies. This bid was the lowest one
received by the Department. The Secretary arbitrarily rejected it, however,
taking the position that he would not accept any bids submitted by a receiver.
The contract was then awarded to someone else. In the resulting mandamus
action the court held the writ inappropriate; however, this decision was not
dictated by the arbitrary nature of the Secretary's action. Rather, the writ
was refused because mandamus cannot be issued "for the purpose of undoing
78
what has been done."
75.
76.
77.
78.

5 Binn. 87 (Pa. 1812).
Id. at 105.
Supra note 62.
Id. at 437.
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Clearly, the "even if wrong" rule was cited merely to bolster the decision
to refuse the writ, the actual reasoning of the court following a more important and decisive pattern. Mandamus, because of its nature, cannot be
used to correct an act which has already been done. Here the secretary had
granted the contract to an innocent third party, and without a retraction of
that grant a forced award to the plaintiff would have been meaningless.
Indeed, no case can be found citing the "even if wrong" rule where
mandamus could not be properly denied without the application of the rule. 79
For example, Horowitz v. Beamishs° is often cited for the "even if wrong"
rule, even though, immediately after quoting the rule, the court conceded
that "the appellant has shown no fraudulent or arbitrary disregard of duty
on the part of the secretary or any mistake in application of the law to the
facts." 8' Again the rule is recognized only as disallowing a modification of
an official's decision which has been delivered properly and in good faith.
Whenever the rule is quoted it is almost certain that the writ will be
denied. It is also safe to assert that a denial of mandamus is almost invariably accompanied by the absence of abuse of discretion, fraud or mistake of
law.8 2 Therefore it may be that the "even if wrong" rule will not serve to defeat
mandamus, otherwise properly sought, if an official or agency has acted
fraudulently, arbitrarily or contrary to law. A survey of the cases seems to
reveal a possible test to determine the availability of mandamus to obtain
judicial review of an agency's decision. Review by means of mandamus
may successfully follow if an affirmative answer can be given to the following
questions:
(1) Are all the procedural and substantive requirements of mandamus present ?83

(2) Do the circumstances justify resort to this extraordinary
remedy ?84
79. Examples of cases paying lip service to the rule but fairly explainable on
other bases are: Martz v. Dietrick, supra note 73 (no abuse of discretion) ; Tannenbaum
v. D'Ascenzo, supra note 65 (no abuse of discretion) ; Morrison v. City of Pittsburgh,
351 Pa. 95, 40 A.2d 406 (1944) (no abuse of discretion); Raffel v. City of Pittsburgh,
340 Pa. 243, 16 A.2d 392 (1940) (action according to law) ; Runkle v. Commonwealth, 97
Pa. 328 (1881) (no abuse of authority) ; Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 82 Pa. 343 (1876)
(no clear legal right) ; and Findley v. City of Pittsburgh, supra note 68 (no corruption
or bad faith).
80. 323 Pa. 273, 185 Atl. 760 (1936).
81. Id. at 275, 185 Atl. at 762.
82. See note 79 supra.
83. That is: (1) no adequate legal remedy is available; (2) the petitioner has
a clear right to the relief he is seeking; (3) the petitioner does not have unclean
hands; and (4) the relief sought is in the nature of an affirmative act-something to
be done, rather than undone.
84. That is, can it be said that, because the action taken was so arbitrary, fraudulent, or contrary to law, no actual exercise of discretion was ever effected?
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In Chapman-Burrous,Inc. v. Board of Fin. & Revenue,8 5 pursuant to
the act regulating the manufacture and sale of oleomargarine in force at the
time, the plaintiff had paid an annual license fee of one hundred dollars for
the privilege of selling oleomargarine for each year from 1943 through 1947.
In 1947 the applicable section was declared unconstitutional, and plaintiff
therefore petitioned the Board of Finance and Revenue for a refund. The
Board granted a refund for 1947 but took no action regarding the other four
years, whereupon plaintiff brought mandamus to compel the Board to act.
The court held that mandamus was proper and ordered the Board to act on
the petition for refund, an action clearly illustrative of the traditional coercive
use of mandamus.
6 case resulted from
A second Chapman-Burrous"
the action of the Board
of Finance and Revenue in response to the order in the first case. The Board
had granted the refund but had limited performance thereof to payment
from an "appropriation" for that purpose, which appropriation simply did
not exist, and the Board had refused to grant a tax credit. Plaintiff therefore sought to compel the Board to grant a tax credit in the amount of the
refund. The Board contended, inter alia, that it had exercised its discretion
properly and that its action should be final, as provided by statute.8 7
If the test set out above is applied to these facts, should mandamus be
granted? Here the plaintiff's right to the refund was clear, and this was
conceded by the board. The statute creating the board provided that its
decision was to be final. It would clearly appear that the plaintiff was without an adequate remedy at law; hence, an affirmative answer to the first
question. The second question also demands an affirmative reply. Here the
board, if not acting under a mistaken view of the law, was undoubtedly
abusing its discretion, for the "iefund order" as so limited was nothing more
than an effective denial of the refund. Therefore mandamus should, and
did, issue.88
Hotel Casey Co. v. Ross,8 9 decided by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
in 1942, seemed to clarify the principle that mandamus may be used as. a
means for obtaining judicial review of an agency's decision. The Hotel Casey
85. Supra note 63.
86. Chapman-Burrous, Inc. v. Board of Fin. & Revenue, 63 Dauphin 258 (Pa. C.P.
1952).
87. See note 5 supra.
88. The court concluded: "[An administrative] body cannot enlarge or diminish
its own jurisdiction under the statute by erroneous construction, and determinations of
this sort are always subject to judicial review ....
[A]n administrative body cannot
violate a statutory mandate even though acting within the general jurisdiction conferred upon it by the statute." Chapman-Burrous, Inc. v. Board of Fin. & Revenue, supra
note 86, at 263-64.

89. Supra note 64.
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Company had applied to the Board of Finance and Revenue for a refund of
taxes which had been paid under a statute which the supreme court subsequently declared inapplicable to hotels. The Board refused the refund, and
by statute the Board's decision was to be final.90 The plaintiff thereafter
brought mandamus to compel the Board to grant the refund. On appeal from
a decision denying the writ, the supreme court recognized that the Board
did not have unlimited discretion in passing on petitions for refunds even
though its decision was to be final. The court noted: "[A]n administrative
tribunal cannot be given an unlimited or arbitrary discretion, for to do so
would result in a government of men instead of a government of laws." 91
In deciding that mandamus would lie the court relied heavily on the fact that
the writ was not employed to interfere with the exercise of discretion by the
Board, but only to compel it to act according to law and within legal limitations, especially those defining its jurisdiction. The Board had misconceived
the extent of its powers and duties and, while an agency normally has the
power to interpret its enabling statute, when its interpretation erroneously
enlarges or diminishes its own jurisdiction, it has not exercised its discretion
within legal limitations. Here the Board simply had no power to deny the
refund.
The Hotel Casey decision was shaken by the case of Kaufman Constr.
Co. v. Holcomb.92 In Kaufman, the plaintiff had contracted with the Commonwealth to build a highway and several bridges. After the work was
completed, the plaintiff sought to recover damages for injury allegedly
caused by delays for which the Department of Highways was responsible.
The construction contract expressly provided that all questions and disputes
were to be referred to the Board of Arbitration of Claims, 93 whose decision
was to be "final and conclusive upon the parties without right of appeal." 94
The Board had disallowed the claim and plaintiff brought mandamus to have
the decision reversed. On appeal the Commonwealth's motion to quash the
writ was granted. The court first pointed out that the plaintiff had agreed to
the finality of the Board's decision, but it then probed the question of the
power of the legislature to preclude the right to review of an agency's deci90. See note 5 supra.
91. Hotel Casey Co. v. Ross, supra note 64, at 580, 23 A.2d at 741.
92. 357 Pa. 514, 55 A.2d 534 (1947).
93. The sole function of the Board of Arbitration of Claims is to arbitrate claims
against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania arising from contracts entered into by the
Commonwealth. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §§ 4651-1 to -10 (1950), as amended, PA.
STAT. ANN.

tit. 72, §§ 4651-1 to -8 (Supp. 1961).

94. Kaufman Constr. Co. v. Holcomb, supra note 92, at 515-16, 55 A.2d at 535. The
applicable statutory provision denying appeal from decisions of the Board of Arbitration
of Claims, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 4651-8 (1950), has since been amended. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 72, § 4651-8 (Supp. 1961) now provides for appellate review of the Board's
decisions.
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sion. In passing on that question the court said that "where the Legislature .

.

. particularly states that no appeal shall be permitted, then review,

beyond determining questions of jurisdiction, cannot be had." 95 Therefore,
mandamus was not available.
Thus, Hotel Casey offered the rule that even where an agency's decision
was declared final, if such agency had abused its discretion or had acted
under a mistaken view of the law, the writ could properly issue to compel
action according to law. However, Kaufman would seem to have adopted
the "even if wrong" rule in its literal sense. Did Kaufman then overrule
Hotel Casey? There appear to be several reasons to justify the conclusion
that it did not.
Early in the Kaufman opinion the court noted that although the plaintiff
was attempting to have the merits of its claim judicially reviewed, it clearly
had contracted away that right. It is clear that parties to an agreement
may expressly waive their rights of appeal.9 Thus, Kaufman may be factually
distinguished from Hotel Casey on that basis.
Moreover, it is significant that, of the authorities cited in Kaufman for
the "even if wrong" rule, 97 not one case concerned a denial of appellate
review of an agency's decision;98 rather, the cases merely supported the
proposition that a statute denying review of a trial court decision reviewing
an administrative determination will be given effect by the courts. Certainly
an aggrieved person who has obtained one complete judicial review of his
case is hardly in a position to attack a statute denying further appellate
review. However, a reading of Kaufman as sanctioning the denial of any
judicial review (without the aforementioned waiver qualification) is therefore entirely unsupported by the authorities cited in the case itself. As was
pointed out in Hotel Casey, the vesting of absolute discretion in an administrative tribunal permits arbitrariness and discrimination and tends toward
"a government of men instead of a government of laws." 99
95. Kaufman Constr. Co. v. Holcomb, supra note 92, at 518, 55 A.2d at 536.
96. See Curry v. Bachrach Quality Shops, 271 Pa. 364, 117 Atl. 435 (1921).
97. Kaufman Constr. Co. v. Holcomb, supra note 92, at 518 (n. 2), 55 A.2d at 536.
98. One case in the court's footnote, Carroll's Appeal, 336 Pa. 257, 9 A.2d 407
(1939), did hold that a statute, permitting only the employee removed by a dismissal
order issued by a city official to appeal an adjudication of the propriety of the order by a
civil service commission, was effective to deny an appeal therefrom by the Pittsburgh
Director of the Department of Public Safety. The court's reasoning, however, was as
follows: "Municipalities are agents of the State, and it may exclude them from the
benefits it gives to individuals." Id. at 259, 9 A.2d at 408.
99. Hotel Casey Co. v. Ross, supra note 64, at 580, 23 A.2d at 741. The Kaufman
opinion also recognized the rule (see note 62 supra and accompanying text) that mandamus
will not lie to compel the undoing of an act already done, and asserted:
It is elementary that [mandamus] . . . cannot be used to control the exercise of
discretion or judgment on the part of a public official or an administrative
or judicial tribunal; nor to review or compel the undoing of action taken by
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One part of the Kaufman opinion does suggest a basis for the assertion
that Hotel Casey has been overruled. That is the statement that mandamus
may not be used "to perform the function of an appeal or writ of error
00
Of the
even though no appeal or writ of error be permitted by law."'
it
lends
one
not
proposition,
this
for
court
Pennsylvania cases cited by the
followed
have
any direct support. It must be conceded that the federal courts
this rule, 1 1 but such was not the law of Pennsylvania, and in light of later
cases to be discussed subsequently, it may be queried whether such is the law
of Pennsylvania today. 10 2 Rather, it would seem reasonable to conclude that
both Hotel Casey and Kaufman were correctly decided, and that both remain
authoritative.
The seemingly inconsistent views of Hotel Casey and Kaufman must
be considered in the light of subsequent cases. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.
v. Board of Fin. & Revenue'0 8 presented the Dauphin County Court of
Common Pleas with a dispute over a refund. Pointing out that the plaintiff,
in his request for a refund, was disputing a valuation made by the Board,
the court said that in order for mandamus to lie the agency's error or breach
of discretion must be clear. 10 4 Otherwise, concluded the court, the mandamus
would be no more than an indirect method of obtaining an appeal, which was
prohibited by statute.' 0 5 The Board's valuation was entirely within the
bounds of its proper discretion; furthermore, no misinterpretation of law
had occurred. It therefore appeared that the relief sought by the plaintiff
completely exceeded the scope of mandamus even under Hotel Casey.
106
the supreme
In Land Holding Corp. v. Board of Fin. & Revenue,
such an official or tribunal in good faith and in the exercise of legitimate

jurisdiction .

. . ."

(Emphasis added.)

Supra note 92, at 526, 55 A.2d at 537. The italicized language would seem to imply an
important limitation to this rule.
100. Ibid.
101. See, e.g., ICC v. United States ex rel. Campbell, 289 U.S. 385, 394 (1933).
102. A final reason for concluding that Kaufman did not overrule Hotel Casey is
based on the nature and purpose of the Board of Arbitration (see note 93 supra). The
sovereign has the unrestricted power to deal with whom it pleases on such grounds as
it sees fit. See Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940). It would seem to
follow that, even if there were no express contractual waiver of appeal, when the
Kaufman Company contracted with the Commonwealth it impliedly consented to arbitration before a board whose decision could properly be made final.
103. 61 Dauphin 431 (Pa. C.P. 1951).
104. In distinguishing the case from one in which mandamus would lie, the court
said:
We do not see how we may review this determination in a mandamus action.
We may not substitute our judgment for [the Board's] ... in a proceeding where
[its] . . . determination is final . . . . We will concede that in a type of case
where the duty of the Board to make a refund is clear, as, for example in excluding shares held by charities, the court in a mandamus action may direct a
refund improperly refused. (Emphasis added.)
Id. at 434. The court cited both Kaufman and Hotel Casey for this proposition.
105. See note 5 supra.
106. 388 Pa. 61, 130 A.2d 700 (1956).
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court was again faced with a request for mandamus to compel a refund of
tax money which the Board had decided should not be paid. The plaintiff
had purchased Pennsylvania land by a deed executed and delivered in Ohio,
but recordation of the deed in Pennsylvania was refused because the realty
transfer tax had not been paid. The plaintiff then paid the tax under
protest, claiming that the act was unconstitutional as applied to a sale and
transfer occurring outside Pennsylvania, and brought mandamus to recover
the taxes so paid. On appeal the supreme court denied the writ and distinguished Kaufman and Hotel Casey.
The court cited the Kaufman case for the proposition that mandamus
cannot be used to compel the undoing of action taken in good faith and in
the exercise of legitimate discretion, nor to perform the function of an appeal
even though no appeal is permitted by law. 07 The court conceded that, when
an agency acts fraudulently or arbitrarily, or when it extends its own j1risdiction by erroneous construction of its enabling statute, its acts are subject
to judicial review.' 08 To distinguish Hotel Casey from Kaufman the court
noted that in Hotel Casey the Board of Finance and Revenue, although acting
within its general jurisdiction, had ignored the supreme court's express mandate declaring the tax in question inapplicable. There existed, therefore, no
doubt as to the impropriety of the Board's action. Evidently the reason the
Land Holding case differed from Hotel Casey was that in Land Holding no
court had previously declared the tax in question unconstitutional or inapplicable, and the Board's action in denying a refund was therefore within
the legitimate bounds of its discretion.
However, the Land Holding Company nevertheless argued that the
Board had misinterpreted the law and therefore its decision was subject to
review by mandamus. To this the court answered that, while mandamus
may be used to review an agency's interpretation of its own enabling statute,
it will not lie to review a decision under any other act which has not been
interpreted by a court. Furthermore, the court noted: "We are aware of no
case holding, where the action of a governmental agency is made final by
statute, that its refusal to declare an Act of the Legislature unconstitutional
may be reviewed by mandamus."' 0 9 The court then concluded that since
suits against the Commonwealth are in the first instance permitted only as a
matter of grace, the legislature can properly leave the disposition of refunds
to the discretion of a governmental agency and prescribe that its action shall
be final.
107. Id. at 68, 130 A.2d at 704.
108. Ibid.
109. Id. at 72, 130 A.2d at 707. See Box Office Pictures v. Board of Fin. & Revenue,
402 Pa. 511, 166 A.2d 656 (1961), following the rule of this case.
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It is interesting to note here the court properly could have denied
mandamus on other grounds. Though the Land Holding Company had no
other apparent remedy at law, because judicial review was specifically precluded by statute, the other requirements for mandamus were not met. Since
the immunity of the sovereign was in question, it could be said that the
110
Finally, as
plaintiff had no clear legal right to the relief that it demanded.
the court noted, the agency apparently had acted in good faith and without
abusing its discretion. For these reasons mandamus was not available to
modify or reverse the result of the exercise of that discretion.
In Highway Paving Co. v. Board of Arbitration of Claims,"' the supreme court reiterated the "even if wrong" rule and pointed out another
problem interfering with the use of mandamus as a means of judicial review.
The case involved a dispute over the jurisdiction of the Board. The general
contractor under a contract with the Pennsylvania Department of Highways
had filed a claim with the Board on behalf of Highway Paving Company, a
subcontractor. The Board refused to hear the claim because Highway
Paving Company had no contract with the Commonwealth. Highway Paving
Company then brought a writ of mandamus which the lower court dismissed," 2 holding that the Commonwealth had not authorized a subcontractor to file a claim with the Board, 113 and that Highway Paving Company had an adequate remedy at law, specifically, an action in assumpsit upon
the contractor's bond.
On appeal, the supreme court cited Kaufman and Land Holding with
approval, stating that the use of mandamus would be nothing more than "a
veiled substitute for an appeal, 11 4 and that since the statute expressly
precluded appeal,""' the scope of judicial review is limited to questions of
jurisdiction and the regularity of the proceedings. The court also quoted the
"even if wrong" rule, and cited Foley Bros. Inc. v. Commonwealth,'" a case
involving the use of narrow certiorari, for that proposition. The court then
concluded:
[I]f the appellant desired to question the determination of the Board
in dismissing the claim, the proper, indeed exclusive, remedy would
110. See note 83 supra.
111. 407 Pa.528, 180 A.2d 896 (1962).
112. Highway Paving Co. v. Board of Arbitration of Claims, 78 Dauphin 292
(Pa. C.P. 1961).
113. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 4651-4 (1950), provides: "[The Board] shall have
jurisdiction to hear and determine all claims against the Commonwealth arising from
contracts hereafter entered into with the Commonwealth ...."
114. Highway Paving Co. v. Board of Arbitration of Claims, supra note 111, at
531, 180 A.2d at 897.
115. See note 94 supra.
116. 400 Pa. 584, 163 A.2d 80 (1960).
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have been to have had [the general contractor]
7

. . .

appeal to this

court on narrow certiorari.1
Upon analysis this case does not seem too far afield from previous decisions. Here, as in Land Holding, the Board in refusing to hear the claim
was in good faith following the provisions of the statute; it was not, as in
Hotel Casey, arbitrarily ignoring an express judicial interpretation of the
statute. Furthermore, the claimant in Highway Paving had an adequate
remedy at law. Nonetheless, the court's reference to narrow certiorari is
disquieting, although this statement, as quoted above, may have been merely
a factual conclusion, not intended to suggest that the availability of narrow
certiorari would preclude mandamus in a proper case.
Rather, it would seem that the court's reliance on the Foley case, together
with its reiteration of the "even if wrong" rule, constitutes a determination
that the scope of review in any case where a statute denies review is coextensive with the limitations of narrow certiorari. This conclusion involves a
paradox, for if a court is similarly limited in mandamus actions and in appeals
on narrow certiorari, then narrow certiorari is at least as adequate as mandamus, as a review device," 8 and mandamus should never lie, except to
compel action where an agency refuses to act in the first instance.
On the other hand, should the intention of the supreme court appear to
be to broaden the writ of narrow certiorari and, in turn, correspondingly
constrict mandamus as a review device, the question arises whether narrow
certiorari constitutes an adequate replacement. As previously noted, certiorari
is generally limited to review of adjudicative actions. 1

9

Because of the diffi-

culty in categorizing the functions of administrative tribunals in various
factual settings, instances will inevitably arise where this inherent limitation
on certiorari will preclude its use, and where mandamus would be the only
efficient means of redress. For instance, review by certiorari of an action
of the State Tax Equalization Board was recently denied, in the case of
Newport Township School Dist. v. State Tax Equalization Bd.,120 on the
ground that the Board was not adjudicating property rights. The Board had
been empowered to determine the taxable value of property within a given
school district in order to provide a uniform tax rate throughout the state.
117. Highway Paving Co. v. Board of Arbitration of Claims, supra note 111, at
530, 180 A.2d at 897. (Emphasis added.)
118. Does the fact that certiorari may be granted only by the supreme court affect
its adequacy as a review device? The availability of mandamus in the Dauphin County
Court of Common Pleas in the first instance would represent a considerable saving of

time and money for litigants, and would ease the ever-increasing workload of the
supreme court.
119.

Short's Estate, 315 Pa. 561, 173 At.

note 13 supra.
120. 366 Pa. 603, 79 A.2d 641 (1951).

319 (1934) ; see text accompanying
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The School District's contention that this function, as applied to it, was
clearly adjudicative in nature, was rejected by the supreme court, which
stated: "The appropriation and distribution of the school subsidy is a peculiar
prerogative of the legislature .

. .

. No property right is involved, and we

must respect the legislative prerogative to control the State's finances .... ,12
Although the tendency of the courts to expand the scope of narrow certiorari
is indeed salutary, it must be recognized that this expansion, if accompanied
by a corresponding diminution in the availability of mandamus, will foreclose review in all cases not clearly adjudicative in nature. Because each
writ has its peculiar function, should not either be available in an appropriate
instance ?
It should be borne in mind that the "even if wrong" rule has never been
used by the courts except in instances where mandamus was inapplicable
for other good reasons.' 2 2 The origin of the rule, as previously mentioned,
was in instances where one complete judicial review had already been obtained, and where the constitutional objection to precluding any judicial
review of determinations of law is missing.' 2 3 For these reasons, it may be
that mandamus is still available to compel action according to law when an
agency has clearly abused its discretion, 2 4 and when narrow certiorari,
because of its inherent limitations, is not available. Only time will provide
the answers to these questions.
PROHIBITION

The writ of prohibition

2 5

may issue from the supreme court 126 to in-

ferior tribunals exercising judicial powers to prohibit them from assuming
121. Id. at 607, 79 A.2d at 643. In the case of Delaware County Nat'l Bank v.
Campbell, 378 Pa. 311, 322, 106 A.2d 416, 421 (1954), the court, in describing the
function of the Board of Finance and Revenue under a refund petition, asserted that
"the action of the Board was a matter of legislative grace and not a judicial act and that
it did not affect property rights."
122. See note 79 supra.
123. See authority cited and text accompanying note 39 supra.
124. Cf. the recent case of Meadville Area School Dist. v. Department of Pub.
Instruction, 398 Pa. 496, 159 A.2d 482 (1960), holding that the refusal of the defendant
to reimburse the school district for its costs in renting a school building was a misinterpretation of ministerial duty and hence "subject to mandamus in the event of
nonperformance." Id. at 501, 159 A.2d at 485. The Department, in refusing the reimbursement, had acted pursuant to an opinion of the attorney general to the effect that the
school district was not entitled to the disputed sum because the rental payment had
been made before the Department had formally approved the lease. See also Duncan Meter
Corp. v. Gritsavage, 361 Pa. 607, 65 A.2d 402 (1949).
125. The ancient writ of prohibition was a prerogative writ of the King, originally
issued exclusively by the Court of King's Bench. For a discussion of the nature of the
writ, see Carpentertown Coal & Coke Co. v. Laird, 360 Pa. 94, 61 A.2d 426 (1948); 3
DAVIS,
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126.

§ 24.04 (1958).

The Act of May 22, 1722, which conferred upon the Pennsylvania Supreme
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jurisdiction they do not have or from abusing their proper jurisdiction. This
extraordinary relief is limited, in the sound discretion of the supreme court,
to instances where no other complete and effective remedy by appeal, certiorari, writ of error, injunction, or other remedy is available. 27 A further
limitation would be that prohibition may be sought only where the tribunal
128
has actually begun proceedings against the relator.
Although this writ would seem to provide an ideal means of stopping
administrative proceedings under an unconstitutional statute or in excess of
a tribunal's statutory powers, the supreme court has all but eliminated its
use insofar as it might apply to administrative tribunals. In Carpentertown
Coal & Coke Co. v. Laird,1' the court was asked to prohibit the State Mining
Commission from further action in proceedings brought against the relator,
on the basis that the Commission was without jurisdiction in the matter. The
supreme court, however, denied the writ because the jurisdictional question
was reveiwable on direct appeal from the Commission's order, as provided
by statute. Query: would this appeal constitute as complete and adequate
a remedy as the writ of prohibition in these circumstances ?180
The Carpentertown decision would seem to have eliminated entirely the
issuance of prohibition to administrative tribunals; for, even when a statutory appeal is expressly denied, narrow certiorari is available to review
abuses of jurisdiction.' 3'
INJUNCTION

The use of an injunction to restrain administrative agencies and officials
from taking affirmative action is another means by which the courts can
Court all the jurisdiction and powers of the Court of King's Bench (see note 7 supra)
is the source of the supreme court's power to issue prohibition.
127. Carpentertown Coal & Coke Co. v. Laird, supra note 125; see First Congressional Dist. Election, 295 Pa. 1, 144 Atl. 735 (1928).
128. Carpentertown Coal & Coke Co. v. Laird, supra note 125, at 100, 61 A.2d at
429 (dictum).
129. Supra note 125.
130. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1501 (1954), providing, inter alia, that "all
parties in interest shall have the same right of appeal from decisions, orders and decrees
of the State Mining Commission to the Superior and Supreme Courts, as now or hereafter provided for appeals from the decisions, orders and decrees of courts of common
pleas . ...
The court concluded: "[Tihe State Mining Commission itself may . . . on argument
directed to it, ultimately conclude that it is without jurisdiction over the prayer of the
petition of the Turnpike Commission; it cannot be assumed that it will finally act if its
lack of jurisdiction be established. If, however, it decides to the contrary and proceeds
to adjudicate the controversy, the questions as to whether or not it has such jurisdiction,
and, if so, whether its final order or decree in the matter is proper, are both determinable
by this Court on appeal . . . ." Carpentertown Coal & Coke Co. v. Laird, supra note
125, at 102-03, 61 A.2d at 430.
131. See authorities cited and text accompanying note 20 supra.
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review the propriety of administrative decisions. The availability of such
relief, however, is not unlimited. The normal bounds which restrict equitable
1 32
jurisdiction are ever present.
The primary limitation on the jurisdiction of a court of equity is that
injunctive relief will not be granted where there is an adequate remedy at law.
This equitable tenet is applicable when the enforcement of an administrative
tribunal's ruling is sought to be enjoined. 1 33 Supplemental to this limitation
is the doctrine that statutory remedies must be exhausted before a party may
resort to equity, a doctrine embodied in the Pennsylvania statute which
declares that "in all cases where a remedy is provided, or duty enjoined, or
anything directed to be done by any act or acts of assembly of this commonwealth, the directions of the said acts shall be strictly pursued .... 14
This statute has been interpreted to preclude equitable relief where the prescribed statutory remedies have not been exhausted. 135 Both theories are
qualified, however, to the extent that equity will grant relief where the
statutory remedy is not adequate and complete, or where its pursuit would
work irreparable harm. 136 Thus it would seem that if the legislature confers upon an administrative tribunal the power to hear and to decide certain
types of matters and, at the same time, authorizes a procedure for reviewing
the decision of the tribunal on the law side of the courts, an aggrieved party
will, in most instances, be constrained to exhaust his administrative remedy
and then appeal to the law side of the court for review.' 37
132. In addition to the general rule that equity will not act where there is an
adequate remedy at law, there are several other pertinent limitations on equitable action.
For example, equity will not act to interfere with the exercise of discretionary acts of
an administrative official unless it appears that his action is based on a misconception
of the law or is so arbitrary and capricious as to constitute an abuse of power. Downing
v. Erie City School District, 360 Pa. 29, 61 A.2d 133 (1948). Nor will equity act to
enjoin the enforcement of a penal statute except where there is considerable doubt as
to the validity of the penal statute and irreparable harm would result from a continuation of the proceedings, Cooper v. McDermott, 399 Pa. 160, 159 A.2d 486 (1960) ; Adams
v. New Kensington, 357 Pa. 557, 55 A.2d 392 (1947), or where property rights are
affected by the statute and the prescribed penalty is so severe that persons affected would
be intimidated from testing its validity by defense to prosecution, Adams v. New
Kensington, supro, or where the statute is not truly penal in nature, Commonwealth v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 10 Pa. D. & C.2d 103 (C.P. 1956).
133. Collegeville Borough v. Philadelphia Suburban Water Co., 377 Pa. 636, 105
A.2d 722 (1954). In Brass Rail Restaurant Co. v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd., 375
Pa. 213, 220, 100 A.2d 80, 83 (1953), the supreme court stated: "It seems to be established by the federal decisions, that where an act affords full opportunity to appear and
be heard, and a right of appeal exists, that administrative boards will not be restrained."
134. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 156 (1952).
135. Collegeville Borough v. Philadelphia Suburban Water Co., supra note 133,
at 645, 105 A.2d at 726; Snyder v. Oestreich, 9 Pa. D. & C.2d 92 (C.P. 1956). In the
Collegeville Borough case, the court noted that its denial of injunctive relief was in
accordance with the federal rule articulated by the Supreme Court in Myers v. Bethlehem
Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1937).
136. Western Pa. Hosp. v. Lichliter, 340 Pa. 382, 17 A.2d 206 (1941).
137. In Culligan Soft Water Service, Inc. v. Board of Fin. & Revenue, 19 Pa.
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Under certain circumstances, however, the availability of additional
administrative remedies or appeal to the law side of the courts will not preclude equitable relief. If the agency has exceeded its statutory authority or
acted unconstitutionally, because of an improper interpretation of the statute
creating it or because of the application of an invalid statute, injunctive
8
13
relief will be available even though an appeal is provided.
This limited exception to the exhaustion requirement has received careful judicial definition, as the following cases involving the action of taxing
authorities serve well to illustrate. The distinction as to when an appeal at
law is appropriate and when an injunction is proper was clearly stated in
Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Hazle Township,13 9 where, in dealing with a
taxing statute, the court stated:
Where there is a want of power to tax or the tax is levied without
authority of law, a bill in equity will lie to restrain its collection....
If the tax is lawful but the manner of collecting it is oppressive or
unfair, or there are technical irregularities in the assessment, the
remedy is at law and by an appeal from the assessment .... 140
This theory has been extended beyond the cases involving the question of
whether there is any power at all in the board to levy the tax, to cases where
it has the power to levy the tax but there is a question whether the board can
41
"levy it at a rate higher than is authorized by law."'
Another distinction relative to taxation turns upon whether the taxing
statute is alleged to be illegal or unconstitutional as to all parties or is unique
in its application to a single taxpayer. 142 Equity will enjoin the enforcement
of such statute if all taxpayers are concerned with the legality of the tax.
However, when the matters involved are unique to a particular taxpayer,
even though illegality or unconstitutionality is alleged, the remedy lies only
43
through administrative and legal proceedings.'
The alleged unconstitutionality of a taxing statute on the grounds that
the tax is levied on property situated outside the taxing district, or that the
tax is assessed on a person who is not a resident of the district, has been
D. & C.2d 232 (C.P. 1959), a preliminary injunction was denied on the ground that
upon completion of administrative action the plaintiff would be protected by available
appeal procedure. But see the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Bell in Jacobs v. Fetzer,
381 Pa. 262, 112 A.2d 356 (1955), suggesting that one deprived of property rights should
not be compelled to exhaust a futile and fruitless procedure.
138. Bell Tel. Co. v. Driscoll, 343 Pa. 109, 21 A.2d 912 (1941).
139. 84 Pa. D. & C. 63 (C.P. 1952), citing Pittsburgh, M.R. Ry. v. Township of
Stowe, 252 Pa. 149, 97 Atl. 197 (1916).
140. Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Hazle Township, supra note 139, at 68.
141. Fleishmann's Vienna Bakery v. Torquato, 12 Pa. D. & C.2d 490 (C.P. 1956).
142. Mellon Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Dougherty, 75 Dauphin 247 (Pa. C.P.
1960).
143. Id. at 249.
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considered in equity and injunctions restraining the levy or collection of the
144
For example, the collection of the
tax have been issued on that basis.

Pennsylvania Corporate Net Income Tax from a trucker engaged in interstate commerce has been enjoined in equity, the court declaring the tax
unconstitutional as applied to a trucker neither residing nor doing busi45
ness in Pennsylvania.
The cases holding that injunctive relief against unauthorized or unconstitutional administrative action is available despite the availability of an
appeal imply that where no appeal is provided an injuncton should be obtainable to restrain any administrative action that is not in accordance with law,
regardless of whether that illegality stems from action in excess of its
jurisdiction or is of an unconstitutional nature. This assertion must be
restricted as to quasi-judicial administrative functions because of the availability of certiorari which may serve as an adequate legal remedy, but as to
quasi-legislative administrative action, where neither certiorari nor, in most
cases, mandamus (because the act is discretionary) will lie, a broad inquiry
into the propriety of administrative action may be available in equity.
DEFENSE TO ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS

Most administrative action depends upon court-imposed enforcement,
through criminal proceedings and suits for penalties, or by mandamus or
injunction proceedings to compel obedience to or to restrain violation of
orders or regulations. The possibility of asserting the invalidity of the action
and thereby gaining a judicial review during the course of such enforcement
proceedings will next be considered.
Where the legislature has provided a direct method for challenging an
administrative adjudication or regulation, collateral attack, including defense
to enforcement proceedings, is usually unavailable. 146 In Commonwealth v.
Ziegler Dairy Co.,147 the defendant appealed a conviction in the quarter
sessions court of violation of a general order promulgated by the Milk Control
Board fixing minimum prices for milk. Without denying its violation of the
order, the defendant urged that the order itself was void because based in
part upon ex parte information and because promulgated as a final order
without the issuance of a tentative order to which parties affected could file
144. Roy Stone Transfer Corp. v, Messner, 377 Pa. 234, 103 A.2d 700 (1954).
145. Ibid.
146. Commonwealth v. Lentz, 353 Pa. 98, 44 A.2d 291 (1945) ; Milk Maid Dairy
Products, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Milk Control Comm'n, 190 Pa. Super. 410, 154 A.2d
274 (1959); Commonwealth v. Zeigler Dairy Co., 139 Pa. Super. 224, 11 A.2d 669
(1940). In Commonwealth v. Lentz, supra at 104, 44 A.2d at 293, the supreme court
concluded that to deny collateral attack to one who failed to exhaust his statutory
remedies "does not offend against any constitutional guarantee."
147. Supra note 146.
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exceptions and offer argument before the Board. Regarding the appellant's
first contention, the court observed that a direct appeal from the order was
provided by the Milk Control Act and could have been availed of by the
appellant. The court then stated:
It is one thing to declare that an order based on the erroneous
consideration by a board or commission of evidence not contained
in the record will be set aside where a party affected thereby has
appealed from the order in accordance with the provisions of the
statute, and quite another thing to hold that such an order, though
unappealed from, is null and void because of such erroneous consideration of evidence, and will not be enforced for any purpose.
The authorities cited by the appellant support the former position;
148
none of them sustains the latter.

Although the order may have been erroneous or voidable, concluded the court,
the mere reliance by the Board on ex parte information did not render the
order void, as suggested by the appellant. 149 Answering the appellant's second
argument, the court stated that the failure of the Board to issue a tentative
order was not fatal because "fair, open and protracted hearings"' 50 had been
held, and that, in any event, the procedure followed by the Board could not
be assailed during collateral proceedings.
Where a statutory appeal is provided and is not utilized to attack an
administrative determination, it would seem that attack during enforcement
proceedings will be limited to instances where the tribunal lacked power
to render such a determination at all, 151 in accordance with the rule that
the action of a tribunal lacking jurisdiction is vulnerable to collateral
attack. Although this result has been articulated in terms of a distinction
between void and voidable action,'15 2 this terminology is often confusing. The
test would appear to be whether the tribunal had the power to issue the
questioned order or rule in the first instance. If, on this basis, the invalidity
of the order or rule is not clear, it seems safe to predict that review during
enforcement proceedings will not be available when the legislature has
prescribed a direct method of review.
Where no appeal from an administrative order or ruling is available,
the question arises whether an attack on the validity of the order, based on
grounds other than lack of power, can be made in defense to enforcement
148. Id. at 232, 11 A.2d at 672.
149. Id. at 233-34, 11 A.2d at 672-73.
150. Id. at 239, 11 A.2d at 675.
151. See Reader, Methods of Judicial Review Where No Direct Appeals Are
Provided, 40 PA. B.A.Q. 303, 343 (1939).
152. Compare Commonwealth ex rel. Milk Control Comm'n v. Hollinger, 79 Pa.
D. & C. 49 (C.P. 1951), appeal dismissed, 170 Pa. Super. 180, 84 A.2d 794 (1951), with
Milk Maid Dairy Products, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Milk Control Comm'n, supra note 146.
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proceedings. It would seem that any legal grounds for challenging the administrative action may be asserted where no appeal therefrom had been
available. 15 3 It must be concluded, however, that reliance on this procedure is
unwise in any situation where another means of redress, such as certiorari or
injunction, is available.
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

It has been suggested that the declaratory judgment would seem ideally
suited for reviewing the determinations of administrative tribunals. 54 In
the absence of declaratory relief, an individual in doubt as to the validity
or constitutionality of an administrative order or regulation applicable to
him may nevertheless have no choice but to comply with it because of the
limited scope of collateral attack during enforcement proceedings. 55 However, the uncertainty attending the availability of declaratory relief in Pennsylvania, coupled with the dearth of authority regarding its application to
administrative action renders it "a limited and risky procedural tool at
best."'15 6
The applicable provision of Pennsylvania's Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act' 57 states that a declaratory judgment "may be granted" in certain
circumstances, subject to the following qualification:
Where, however, a statute provides a special form of remedy for a
specific type of case, that statutory remedy must be followed; but
the mere fact that an actual or threatened controversy is susceptible
of relief through a general common law remedy, or an equitable
remedy, or an extraordinary legal remedy, whether such remedy is
recognized or regulated by statute or not, shall not debar a party
from the privilege of obtaining a declaratory judgment or decree
in any case where the other essentials to such relief are pres158
ent ....
The "other essentials," as set forth by Mr. Chief Justice Bell in Allstate Ins.
Co. v. Seward, 5 9 are: (1) the absence of a more appropriate remedy, (2) the
presence of compelling and unusual circumstances; (3) the absence of any
dispute of facts; and (4) "a clear manifestation that the declaration sought
153. Reader, supra note 151, at 343.
154. See Reader, spra note 151, at 331; Borchard, Declaratory Judgments in
Administrative Law, 11 N.Y.U.L. REV. 139 (1933).
155. See pp. 26-27 supra.
156. Reader, supra note 151, at 340.
157. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 831-53 (1953). The "Historical Note" to section 836 states: "This section as originally enacted, was identical with the provisions of
section 6 of the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, see 9 Uniform Laws Annotated,
but all resemblance was removed by the amendments." See Levin, Declaratory Judgments in Pennsylvania, 12 Purdon's Statutes (preceding § 731) XV (1953).
158. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 836 (1953).
159, 407 Pa. 628, 182 A.2d 715 (1962).
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will be a practical help in terminating the controversy."' 160 This language,
together with the above-quoted statute, would seem to sanction the use of a
declaratory judgment by one wishing to contest the validity of administrative
action, rather than risk the hazardous procedure of violation and collateral
attack. The only case clearly precluded by the act would seem to be where "a
statute provides a special form of remedy for a specific type of case." On the
other hand, the availability of declaratory relief, being subject in the first
instance to the sound discretion of the trial court, 161 is always to a great
extent uncertain.
The history of the statutory provision circumscribing the courts' exercise
of discretion in granting or withholding declaratory judgments definitely
indicates an attempted broadening of the scope of the remedy. The original
provision, enacted in 1923,162 was construed to permit declaratory relief only
in the absence of "another equally serviceable remedy."' 63 In 1935 the act
was amended to its present form, except that the additional requirement that
"the case is not ripe for relief by way of such common law remedy, or extraordinary legal remedy .... ,,164 was included in the 1935 amendment. Although the entire amendment apparently represented an attempted expansion
of the courts' discretion, the availability of a common law or extraordinary
remedy was held to preclude the declaratory judgment.' 65 The final amendment in 1943166 eliminated the requirement that common law or extraordinary
relief be unavailable. The net effect of this history has been recently summarized by the supreme court as follows:
An examination of the legislative history of the 1923, 1935
and 1943 statutes, considered in the light of the decisions of this
Court interpretive of the 1923 and 1935 statutes, clearly reveals the
intent of the legislature that declaratory judgments be considered an
alternative, rather than an extraordinary, remedy and that the existence of another remedy, in law or in equity, will not per se bar
16 7
declaratory judgment.
However, recent decisions

6s

would seem to indicate that the supreme court

160. Id. at 631, 182 A.2d at 717.
161. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Seward, supra note 159.
162. Act of June 18, 1923, P.L. 840, § 6.
163. Leafgreen v. La Bar, 293 Pa. 263, 142 Atl. 224 (1928).
164. Act of April 25, 1935, P.L. 72, § 1.
165. Allegheny County v. Equitable Gas Co., 321 Pa. 127, 183 Atl. 916 (1936)
Oberts v. Blickens, 131 Pa. Super. 77, 198 Atl. 481 (1938).
166. Act of May 26, 1943, P.L. 645, § 1.
167. Johnson Estate, 403 Pa. 476, 171 A.2d 518 (1961).
168. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Seward, supra note 159; McWilliams v. McCabe,
406 Pa. 644, 179 A.2d 222 (1962). In McWilliams v. McCabe, supra at 661, 179 A.2d
at 230, Mr. Justice Jones, in a separate concurring and dissenting opinion, pointed out:
"In my opinion, to hold that the existence of another available remedy per se bars

30
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has reverted to its pre-1943 "extraordinary" view of declarative relief. Although the granting of such relief concededly is a matter of discretion,
it must be acknowledged that the Legislature has been consistent in attempting
to render the relief more readily obtainable. Whether this intent will ultimately
be effectuated is open to speculation.
The paucity of declaratory judgments in the administrative law area
bears testimony to the skepticism with which the remedy is viewed generally.
Certainly, it may be concluded that, when a specific statutory review procedure
is provided, declarative relief is unavailable. Beyond this, however, generalization is hazardous.
declaratory judgment is to turn the clock backward, to ignore the clear legislative

mandate, and to confuse both the bench and the bar."

